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JOHN WORRALL (London School of Economics)


I feel honoured to have been invited to give this lecture, but I must admit that the first sentence of Jim Lennox’s letter of invitation initially worried me.  It asked me to talk tonight about the impact of philosophy of science on British culture.  And, although it tends to surprise many Americans, whose ideas of Britain and its culture perhaps owe more than a little to "Masterpiece Theatre", it's a sad fact that a majority of Britons, even (perhaps especially) of middle class Britons, sympathise with Goering's  well known attitude: 'When I hear anyone talk of culture, I reach for my revolver'.  (Though I discovered in the course of preparing this lecture that Goering, a criminal from his head to his toe, seems even to have stolen this striking, if unpleasant, remark: the Nazi playwright Hanns Josht has a storm trooper say in his 1934 play Schlageter (one which Goering presumably saw) “Wenn ich Kultur hoere … entsichere ich meinen Browning…”.)  Well, fortunately Jim’s letter went on to make it clear that he was not looking for an assessment of the impact of philosophy of science on what might be called high culture, and the way I have interpreted his request (perhaps not quite in the way he intended) is to talk on the general impact of philosophy of science in Britain, outside of academic philosophy, indeed outside academic circles generally.


I want first to sketch the recent history of philosophy of science in Britain and its general impact (tying this in a little with its interaction over the years with the Pittsburgh Center and with Pittsburgh people); and after that to spend a rather longer time looking forward. The best way to celebrate an anniversary like that of the Pittsburgh Center is, I think, not just by looking backwards but also by looking ahead.  And it does seem to me, for reasons that I’ll outline, that philosophy of science is more and more relevant in the modern world: C.P. Snow's famous 'two cultures' still exist, especially in Britain, and yet there is an ever-increasing need to bridge those two cultures and to ensure that increasingly-many people understand science. What especially needs to be understood, however, for reasons that I shall explain, are not so much the results of science - as fascinating and wonderful as they often are - but rather the methods of science and particularly the logic of evidence: the role played by evidence in evaluating theoretical claims.   And the methods of science and the way that evidence is used in science to evaluate theoretical claims have always held centre-stage in the philosophy of science.  This is why the philosophy of science - not in any new fangled sense but exactly as traditionally construed - has a vitally important role to play in British society and, I would suggest, for much the same reasons, worldwide. 






 Philosophy of Science in Britain
So let me begin with some potted history.  Some of you will know the poem  Annus Mirabilis by Philip Larkin whose first lines are


Sexual intercourse began 
In nineteen sixty-three
(Which was rather late for me) --
Between the end of the Chatterley ban
And the Beatles' first LP.


Well I suppose that, in something like the same sense that sexual intercourse began in Britain in 1963, you might say that philosophy of science in Britain began in 1946. Of course it seems a reasonable bet that there had been a good deal of intercourse about before 1963, and there had equally been philosophy of science about in Britain before Karl Popper arrived in London from New Zealand in 1946. 

In fact, Britain has a long and distinguished history in the subject in the modern era stretching back to Francis Bacon.  Bacon failed quite abysmally to write the works of Shakespeare, but he did succeed in developing ideas about experiment and induction that were instrumental in founding the Royal Society and hence in the great outburst of scientific discovery in Britain in the 17th Century.  Later came the so-called British empiricists  - John Locke (who, by the way, gave what I think is the right characterisation of the philosopher as an 'underlabourer to the scientist’), George Berkeley and David Hume, and then, into the 19th Century, John Stuart Mill and the especially acute and perhaps still underrated William Whewell.  It should also be emphasised of course that you don't have to be a philosopher to make contributions to philosophy of science.  Despite the gibe of my friend and mentor Imre Lakatos -who used to say that expecting scientists to say sensible things about science was like expecting fish to say sensible things about the laws of hydrodynamics - scientists unsurprisingly can be very insightful, if also it should be admitted often erratic and unsystematic, philosophers of science.  Amongst the British, James Clerk Maxwell and Lord Kelvin for example had some insightful views about the methods of science, as above all did Isaac Newton - perhaps the greatest scientist of them all.  Newton’s view that the best theories in science, the real scientific results, the elements of ‘experimental philosophy’ as he called it, are assertions that can be ‘deduced from the phenomena’ although often pooh-poohed as logical nonsense is in fact an insight of first rate importance as work by Jon Dorling and others, including here in Pittsburgh Clark Glymour and later John Norton has recognised.

Finally and returning to academic philosophy and by now in the 20th Century, there were two figures of no little note around in Cambridge at the time that Popper arrived in London - the absolutely stellar Bertrand Russell and surely the most influential philosopher of the 20th Century, Ludwig Wittgenstein; while  Frank Ramsey's brilliant career there had been cut tragically short by his death in 1930 at the age of 26.  Ramsey and especially Russell knew mathematics and science back-to-front, of course, and Wittgenstein's influence in continental Europe - notably through the Vienna Circle - was largely on philosophers of a definite scientific bent.  Yet it's fair to say, I think, that in Britain Ramsey had almost no initial impact and while Russell's analytic approach to philosophy and his work in logic and philosophy of language had enormous influence, his work in the theory of knowledge, evoked surprisingly little interest.  Wittgenstein's epistemology , on the contrary of course had almost overwhelming impact, and yet in Britain his influence was pretty exclusively on people almost entirely lacking scientific backgrounds.  These facts can I think be in part explained by the 'two cultures' phenomenon that I shall discuss at greater length later.  There is no doubt that the arts-science divide was especially deep in early to mid 20th century Britain and the divide is only very gradually breaking down. Philosophy was traditionally very much an arts subject in British terms and this meant that Ramsey's mathematically sophisticated views and Russell's more scientifically demanding views were largely terra incognita while Wittgenstein's immense influence produced not the Vienna Circle but Oxford linguistic and commonsense philosophy. This involved approaching epistemology, the theory of knowledge, the central core of philosophy, not by investigating in detail the achievements of scientific knowledge but essentially by mapping the presuppositions and logical geography of the man on the Clapham omnibus (or more accurately the man in the standard Oxbridge Senior Common Room). 

So just as something important happened with sexual intercourse in the early 60s, so something important happened with philosophy of science in 1946:  Popper's arrival at the London School of Economics in that year did indeed herald the start of a fresh start for philosophy of science in Britain.  Popper was not the only opponent of ordinary language philosophy in Britain at the time, another influential voice belonged to A.J.Ayer who moved to London (in his case University College, London) in that same year, 1946.  But there was something importantly ground-breaking within the British context about Popper's approach.  For Popper, whatever his other virtues and vices, certainly had great respect for, and a good grasp of, science and of physics in particular.  He instituted a tradition which I am glad to say is very much alive and well at the LSE of approaching central issues in philosophy - notably issues concerned with human knowledge - on the basis of secure and solid mastery of the sciences, as the best exemplars of human knowledge.  This is a tradition of course that we very much share with the Pittsburgh Center and which the Center has done so much to foster worldwide.  It is also one that later spread to other small groups in Britain - notably at Oxford and at Cambridge.  Remembering my earlier remarks about the depth of the two-culture division in post-war Britain, it is noteworthy that both Popper himself and his most distinguished successor in Britain , Imre Lakatos, should both have been educated outside of the British tradition.  Popper arrived in London from New Zealand to where he had in turn fled from his home in Vienna and the imminent Nazi occupation. And Lakatos arrived in the UK in 1956 fleeing from a different sort of tyranny - a Stalinist one. He was brought up and educated in Hungary and had recently spent three years in Recsk, the worst of the gulag-style camps in Hungary.

In terms of general impact, no philosopher of science can have had more than Popper  has had in Britain.  This is surely partly due to the fact that at the core of his ideas is a very simple notion that, so he argued, in fact has great power:  the notion that progress is made through attempting to criticise the best ideas that we have so far had.  In science we propose bold conjectures, which are then subjected to the most searching experimental or observational criticism that we can muster - sometimes the best conjectures survive this critical ordeal for a while (are 'corroborated' in Popper's terms), but even the best may eventually be rejected and replaced by an alternative - there being, as he said, no better fate for any theory than to live on as a limiting case of a still more powerful theory.  Popper extended this idea to society in his famous two volume work The Open Society and its Enemies: what fundamentally distinguishes liberal democracies from totalitarian regimes, he argued, is the tolerance of criticism and the existence of systems for peaceful replacements of governments in the light of successful criticism.

At least two Nobel Prize winners - Peter Medawar and John Eccles - spoke glowingly of the importance of Popper's ideas in their own scientific developments.  In the biomedical sciences in particular, Popper is still thought of as the philosopher of science.  While politically in Britain, almost everyone claimed to be influenced by Popper.  Mrs Thatcher didn't of course actually read him, but she was informed by her early eminence gris Keith Joseph that many of her reforming ideas were Popperian in spirit; several notable Labour politicians - including the former Chancellor Denis Healey - felt that their political views were in line with Popper's; while he was explicitly cited as a major inspiration in the founding statements of the relatively new Liberal Democratic Party.  Of course the fact that Popper seems to be, in this respect at least, 'all things to all people' has suggested to many less impressionable souls that maybe the apparently powerful ideas underlying Popper's position are after all nothing of the sort.

And indeed Popper's ideas, both in politics and in their homeland of philosophy of science, have fared less well amongst philosophers than they have in more general circles.  Foremost amongst the direct critics of Popper's account of science were two major Pittsburgh figures - Adolf Grunbaum and the late, and sadly missed, Wesley Salmon.  Popper believed that there was and need be no inductive element in science - no assumption linking the past performance of a theory in tests with its likely overall truth and hence with its future performance in applications.  His method was meant to be simon-pure deductivist: theories are conjectured (we know not how), consequences are deduced from them about experimentally observable events, these consequences either agree with the actual results of experiment or they don't; if they don't the theory is refuted, if they do then the theory is simply (so far) unrefuted - not confirmed in any inductivist sense, not made any more likely to be successful in further tests. Salmon argued that Popper's view cannot 

do justice to the problem of rational prediction in contexts of practical decision-making ….[Moreover] science is inevitably inductive in matters of intellectual curiosity as well as practical prediction.  It may be possible to excise all inductive arguments from science, but if the operation were successful, the patient (science), deprived of all predictive import, would die.

Grunbaum argued that the notion of a severe test - a crucial notion in Popper's account since the more severe the tests a theory has survived the more scientifically meritorious it is taken to be - has in fact no justification within Popper's purely deductivist view; that Popper's account of how one theory might have got closer to the truth than another by answering more questions fails; and finally that Popper's claims about Freudian psychoanalysis were importantly inaccurate.  Another of Popper's central ideas was that what demarcates science from pseudoscience, from those theories that masquerade as science rather than actually achieving that status, is that while science is falsifiable - for any genuinely scientific theory, there are specifiable experimental or observational outcomes that would, if they really occurred, falsify that theory, pseudoscientific theories are entirely unfalsifiable - any possible observation can be accommodated by those theories, nothing could refute them. Freudian psychoanalytic theory was one of Popper's favourite examples of an unfalsifiable theory (the other was Marx's theory of history); Grunbaum argued that so far as Freud's theory was concerned at least, Popper was wrong. Of course it is something of an understatement that Grunbaum holds that the case for Freud's theories is vitiated by a number of methodological defects - but Popperian unfalsifiability is in fact one of the few methodological defects that Freud's theory fails to suffer from.

One of the suggestions that Jim Lennox and I discussed for the main theme of this lecture tonight was indeed that I might go in more detail into the history of these London-Pittsburgh debates.  But I rapidly decided that, fascinating as that might prove, it would be rather embarrassing for me, since I'm afraid that I think that the outcome put in Soccer terms  was the unlikely score of 

POPPER UNITED 0      REICHENBACH ROVERS 9  (Scorers: Salmon 3, Grunbaum 3, Popper (own goals) 3)

Or, since there is still something of a cultural gap here, putting it in terms more appropriate for the US 


POPPER PANTHERS 0   REICHENBACH RAIDERS 63  (Salmon 300 yards passing for 3 TDs; Grunbaum 200 yards rushing for 3 TDs; Popper three fumbles run in for 99 yard TDs)

I anyway wanted this talk, as I said at the beginning, to be more positive and forward-looking. So I want to spend the rest of the time looking more to the present and the future.


Philosophy of Science - A Subject with a Great Future

Many of you will remember, or know of, C.P. Snow's  idea that in 1950s and early 60s Britain at any rate those people educated in science and those educated in the arts or humanities had come to share so little in common that they constituted in effect two separate cultures.  Snow was in a good position to comment since he was a scientist by profession and a novelist by vocation: 

…constantly I felt I was moving among two groups - comparable in intelligence …  , earning about the same incomes, who had almost ceased to communicate at all, who in intellectual, moral and psychological climate had so little in common that instead of going from Burlington House or South Kensington to Chelsea, one might have crossed an ocean.

Although concerned with scientists' occasionally boorish attitude towards the arts and aware of how impoverishing this was for them, Snow was particularly concerned with the flipside of this cultural division:

But what of the [Arts] side?  They are impoverished too - perhaps more seriously, because they are vainer about it.  They still like to pretend that the traditional culture is the whole of  'culture', as though the natural order didn't exist. As though the scientific edifice of the physical world was not, in its intellectual depth, complexity and articulation, the most beautiful and wonderful collective work of the mind of man.  Yet most non-scientists have no conception of that edifice at all…. It is rather as though, over an immense range of intellectual experience, a whole group was tone-deaf … They give a pitying chuckle at the news of scientists who have never read a major work of English literature.  They dismiss them as ignorant specialists.  Yet their own ignorance and their own specialisation is just as startling.  A good many times I have been present at gatherings of people who, by the standards of the traditional culture, are thought to be highly educated and who have with considerable gusto been expressing their incredulity at the illiteracy of scientists.   Once or twice I have been provoked and have asked the company how many of them could describe the Second Law of Thermodynamics.  The response was cold: it was also negative. Yet I was asking something which is about the scientific equivalent of: Have you read a work of Shakespeare's?

I now believe that if I had asked an even simpler question - such as, What do you mean by mass, or acceleration, which is the scientific equivalent of saying, Can you read? - not more than one in ten of the highly educated would have felt that I was speaking the same language.


Now, you can overdo the extent of the cultural separation as Snow himself admitted in subsequent discussion of his thesis; but there is, as people say without quite knowing what it means, a "good deal of truth" in it.  Snow himself thought that the divide was only ‘slightly exaggerated’ in the UK compared with elsewhere and that it was a problem for the ‘entire West’ – and in particular therefore for the US:

after a few thousand Atlantic miles, one found Greenwich Village talking precisely the same language as Chelsea, and both having about as much communication with M.I.T. as though the scientists spoke nothing but Tibetan.


From my own experience, however, I'd say that the problem has always been especially acute in the UK compared to the US.  I could spend the rest of the lecture speculating about the causes of this; but they certainly include: first a long-term snobbery connected with science – generally thought of as ‘mechanical’: the real gentleman reads history, or greats or classics and, if he works at all, becomes a gentleman farmer like his father, a high court judge or a top Civil Servant; and secondly the effects of the Oxbridge system which has fostered, and is in turn supported by, over-early overspecialisation - in Britain it is still perfectly possible for an academic high-flyer to have no more than the very basic science taught up to the age of 16 and absolutely nothing thereafter. 

I do believe that the two culture division is gradually eroding even in Britain and it is, at last, being recognised that our educational system allows for, indeed requires amongst the academically-inclined, a much too early overspecialisation. But just how far we have to go and just how strong the entrenched interests are is shown by the snail’s pace of reform. Again I could spend the rest of the lecture speculating on the reasons for the gradual breakdown of the barriers between the two cultures over the past couple of decades: one major factor is surely the impressive developments in genetics – my sociologist friends at the LSE now speak of ‘post-genomic society' - developments that have focussed people much more than before on their own biological background.

But, eroding or not, the barriers are definitely still there and we are anyway still suffering from the consequences of the times when the barriers were altogether less penetrable. Here’s one very minor symptom of this that echoes Snow’s own sentiments and one that always amuses me.  One of the BBC radio stations – it used to be called the Home Service and now Radio Four – continues to attract an audience whose size does great credit to the British.  Alongside the Radio plays, the classic serials, the current affairs programmes and the comedy shows (Douglas Adams’s wonderful Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy for example began life as a Radio Four serial), and, crucially, no advertisements, there’s the occasional ‘high brow’ quiz programme – the doyen of these programmes was ‘Brain of Britain’.  The questions that the ‘Retired headmasters’, Civil Servants and the rest were asked, and usually answered, about the minutiae of British and European history and literature were amazing (‘What was the exact date of the first performance of Handel’s ‘Music for the Royal Fireworks’? Which Shakespeare play contains the line ‘The elephant hath joints, but none for curtsey, his legs are legs for necessity, not for flexure’?), while the very occasional question about science tended to be on a par with ‘What is the three letter acronym for the genetic material known to have a double helical structure’?’ or ‘According to Newton’s 3rd law of mechanics, to every action there’s an equal and opposite what?’

One indication of the fact that further work needs to be done to help the erosion process has been the appointment at London and Oxford Universities of new professorial chairs in the ‘Public Understanding of Science’ – Richard Dawkins, of selfish-gene fame, was appointed to the Oxford Chair just a year or so ago.  But the most important contributors to clearing the detritus left by the two cultures culture surely ought to be philosophers of science.  This is because, as I hinted at the beginning, what the generally educated (or rather miseducated) public principally needs to understand are not so much the results of science, but rather its methods and in particular the methods science employs in evaluating theoretical claims in the light of evidence. Surprisingly many urgent social issues rest on failure to understand the logic of evidence.  And the logic of evidence is of course philosophy of science topic number one. Perhaps surprisingly scientists themselves don't seem to be very good at explaining to the public the power and limitations of evidence – philosophers should give them the lead.  In the rest of this lecture I want to consider three illustrative examples.  

Case one: MMR and the good old post hoc ergo propter hoc

Over the past few months in Britain there has been much concern about the combined MMR (Measles, Mumps and Rubella) vaccine - a vaccine that has become standard prophylaxis for infants more or less across the developed world.   The real furore seems to have started when Tony Blair refused to say publicly whether or not his new baby had had the MMR vaccine.  It reached a crescendo in January and February of this year and its consequences - a significant decrease in the uptake for MMR - continue to be felt.  The concern focussed on a possible causal link between administration of the MMR vaccine and the development of autism.   I heard several discussions – again often on blessed Radio Four – between scientific experts and leaders of pressure groups of concerned parents.  The scientific expert would several times assert that there is no scientific evidence of any link between autism and MMR.  The concerned parent would say that that must mean that evidence was not collected from the right babies – because she is in contact with hundreds of parents of children who have been damaged by the MMR vaccine .  I waited for the scientific expert to utter the mantra ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc’ or, rather, of course, non-Latin words to that effect. But he  just kept reiterating that there is no scientific evidence to link MMR and autism.

But people are not going to be convinced by authoritative statements – not any longer, and, in many ways, a good job too. What needs to be explained is exactly why there is no scientific evidence of the alleged link and in particular exactly why anecdotal evidence is of no scientific value.   And every philosopher of science, who takes in the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy with his mother’s milk, knows how.   Of course one’s heart goes out to these parents, but what needs gently to be explained is that they are not, or at any rate very well may not be, in contact with hundreds of children who have been damaged by MMR.  They are no doubt in contact with hundreds of children who first had the MMR jab (until the recent scares, there was a very high take up rate for the vaccine), and then were later diagnosed as autistic, but this tells us nothing at all about a causal link unless we have some indication of what would have happened to those children had they not had the vaccine.  And this of course requires  - amongst other things - careful comparison of autism rates amongst those given MMR, with autism rates amongst those not given MMR.  Not having gone into the question here in any depth, I make no claim that the scientific establishment and the British government are right that such a detailed comparison, along of course with other evidence particularly from other countries, provides no evidence for an MMR-autism link.  But what is certainly true is that at least part of the reason why many involved parents do not believe the scientific establishment is that they have been seduced by a simple evidential fallacy - you can't automatically infer, or rather you can't automatically validly infer, that because event B follows event A, A was the cause of B.  

Coming back to Pittsburgh personalities, a central theme of Grunbaum’s celebrated criticism of the empirical evidence allegedly in favour of the effectiveness of Freudian psychoanalysis is exactly that no systematic attempt has been made to rule out the possibility of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. No matter how many successful cases Freud could cite – cases where someone who had been given Freudian therapy was taken to enjoy a remission of some neurotic or psychotic symptoms – those cases prove nothing about the causal effectiveness of the therapy without some data about spontaneous remission rates - that is, about what is likely to have happened had Freud's patients not been given psychoanalytic therapy.

My favourite example of the need to be aware of the possibility of committing this fallacy is, with apologies to those of you who may have heard it before, this one.  A reporter heard about a man alleged to be 130 years old, living in a remote part of Sardinia, so off she went to check up on the story and to try to interview him. The reporter checked the local records and checked with the local historians and yes indeed this guy is 130 years old.  So off she went to his cottage to interview him.  What’s the secret of his longevity? she rather predictably asks.  ‘No drinking, no smoking and no sex’ he replies firmly. She asks him some more questions but keeps being distracted by all sorts of sounds coming from the next room – gigglings, gruntings, popping of corks and tinklings of glass. Just as she is about to leave she gets up the courage to ask ‘What’s going on next door?’  ‘Oh don’t worry about that’ the old man replies ‘ that’s just dad having a drink and a smoke with some of the girls from the village!’  So ok he didn’t indulge in drinking, smoking or sex and he lived to be 130 years old, but doesn’t follow that his non-indulgence was the reason why he lived so long.


Case two: Expert evidence and forgetting about the ‘priors’

For my second example of an area of great public concern involving evidential issues, I turn from medicine to that other great bastion of conservatism in England: the law. It's a standing joke just how far out of touch are English judges - who traditionally have come exclusively from the lesser nobility and very upper, upper middle classes. John Mortimer, the playwright and former lawyer, tells the story of the Judge who had homeless Paddy in front of him pleading guilty to being drunk and disorderly for the sixth or seventh time in recent months: 'Mr Murphy  I have decided to give you one final chance, I shan't send you to jail but only if you promise me that you'll give up drink completely.'  O yes yer 'onour, I surely will give it up'.  'Come on now I want you to be really serious - promise me: not even a tiny drop of sherry before dinner.'

Of course it's trite that the law is concerned with evidence, but until recently there seems to have been very strong resistance to the idea that formal results developed in the study of the logic of evidence could be of any relevance to considerations of legal evidence. But this at last appears to be breaking down - largely under the pressure of increased legal reliance on 'expert' testimony, and more particularly  DNA profiling evidence, so-called genetic fingerprinting.

DNA profiles and 'match probabilities' play an increasingly major role in increasingly many criminal trials.  A DNA profile with a match probability of, say, 1 in 5 million means that there is a 1 in 5 million chance that a person chosen at random from the population will have that same profile.  (For current purposes, I'll be taking these probabilities at face value but another of the interesting things that I learnt in preparing this lecture is that there are real questions about how seriously they themselves ought to be taken. A group of experts from the UK Forensic Science Service, for example, write  'As more and more loci are employed, so the standard calculation produces numbers that are further and further beyond the realms that can be investigated by statistical methods.  The tiny numbers, although not necessarily "wrong", are without any real meaning.')  But taking these probabilities at face value, and supposing that Joe Bloggs has been charged with a crime and that his DNA matches that found at the scene, the issue arises of just how strong evidence of Bloggs' guilt those probabilities supply.

The temptation is to infer that if the match probability is 1 in 5 million and Bloggs' DNA matches the crime-scene DNA then there is only a 1 in 5 million chance that Bloggs is innocent and hence a chance of  4,999,999 in 5 million that he's guilty - which seems likely to count as  'beyond reasonable doubt' on anyone's view of that hopelessly vague notion.  And indeed there has been a series of recent cases in the UK where persons have been convicted solely on the basis of DNA evidence - including one famous case (Regina v Deen, 2000) in which the accused was convicted of a burglary in Manchester on the basis of a cited DNA match probability of 1 in 37 million no less, only for a later more refined DNA analysis conclusively to show him to be innocent.  So why is it wrong – as it is indeed wrong -  to read off the probability of guilt from the DNA match probability?  And how is the correct probability of guilt to be calculated?

Experts will detect the direction in which we are heading here: the importance of taking prior probabilities into account is another of the things that the philosopher of science takes in with her mother's milk.  Although every philosopher of science knows the importance of prior probabilities (or ought to), there is a series of experiments dating back to the 1970s that purports to show that people in general are very bad at probabilistic reasoning, precisely because they are very good about forgetting the priors.  The exact weight that these experiments themselves should carry has itself been the subject of controversy but let's again take them at face value for present purposes.  Here's a nice (somewhat rationally reconstructed) example.

You are told   that Tommy Atkins is a professor at a US university - in fact that he's either a professor of classics or a professor of sociology.   You are also given a profile of Tommy:  he votes republican, supports the death penalty and is neat and tidy invariably wearing a suit and tie to work.   So what do you think?  Is Tommy more likely to be a professor of classics or a professor of sociology.  I won't embarrass you, or rather those of you who haven't come across this sort of problem before, by asking for a vote.  But in fact the experimenters report that most people when told this story say that they think it is very much more likely that Tommy is a classics professor than a sociology professor.  This judgment, however common, overlooks the fact that there are many more sociology professors in the US than there are professors of classics.  Of course the little pen portrait of Tommy fits our stereotype of the classics professor a lot better than it fits our stereotype of the sociology professor.   But that means that the probability that someone should have the characteristics cited in the pen portrait, given that he is a classics professor is higher than the probability that he should exhibit those characteristics, if he is a professor of sociology.  What we are looking for, however, are the inverse probabilities to these: the probability that Tommy is a classics professor, given that he exhibits the specified characteristics, compared to the probability that he is a sociology professor given that he exhibits those characteristics.

A simple probability calculation allows us to perform this conversion.  Let D be the fact that he fits the description given, C that he is a Classics professor and S that he is a sociology professor, then





P(S/D) = P(D/S). P(S)/P(D)

Since P(D) occurs in both expressions it drops out in the comparison and we have 

P(C/D) > P(S/D) iff P(D/C) P(C) > P(D/S) P(S)

So the arithmetic, no matter how painful for those in culture one, exhibits exactly the crucial issues: we need to take into account not only the likelihood that a classics or sociology professor would exhibit the listed characteristics but also what the probabilities - the so-called prior probabilities - are that someone drawn at random from the set of all classics and sociology professors is of one kind or the other.  The evidence that Tommy exhibits the cited characteristics certainly increases the probability that he is a classics professor compared to the probability that he is a sociology professor, but we shouldn't infer that he's more likely to be in classics until we know the initial or prior probabilities of being in classics compared to being in sociology.  The message, obvious once it has been articulated, is this: ok there may be more tie-wearers amongst classics professors than sociology professors - let's say that it's  50 times more likely that you'll wear a suit and tie, vote Republican etc if you're a classics professor than if you're a sociology professor, nonetheless if there are 100 times more professors of sociology than of classics, it is twice as likely that Tommy is a sociology professor even given that he has this profile. 

Similarly in the case of DNA profiling, the message needs to be got across loud and clear that prior probabilities and not just the match probabilities need to be taken into account.  I'd like to think it was something like a recognition of the importance of taking prior probabilities into account rather than the notorious conservatism of the law that lies behind the following statement by Judge Harrison in Regina v Clark (October 2000) 
I should … members of the jury … sound a note of caution about the statistics. However compelling you may find those statistics to be, we do not convict people in these courts on statistics.  It would be a terrible day if that were so.

But the statement is misguided.  If  'statistics' is understood in the broad sense to include probabilistic reasoning generally, then I think that consciously or not, jurors inevitably do use statistics, probabilistic reasoning, to convict or acquit in every case. What jurors should be being advised to do is of course to use the statistics properly, not fallaciously.  Certainly the recognition that it is an outright fallacy to infer from a match probability of say 1 in 5 million, and the fact that the accused's DNA matches that at the crime scene, that there is only a 1 in 5 million chance that the accused is innocent is what lies behind the worthy but again rather unclear advice laid down by the U.K. Court of Appeal after long consideration of these issues.  It recommended that jurors be instructed in these cases along the following lines:

Members of the jury, if you accept the scientific evidence called by the Crown, this indicates that there are probably only four or five white males in the United Kingdom from whom the semen could have come.  The defendant is one of them. If that is the position, the decision you have to reach, on all the evidence, is whether you are sure that it was the defendant who left that stain or whether it is possible that it was one of the other small group of men who share the same DNA characteristics.

This uses what are called 'expected values' to try to get the point across.  In this case it was known that the guilty person was white, and he had produced semen so the population at issue is the set of sexually active males in the UK at the time.   If the size of this population is around 22 million, and there is a 1 in 5 million match probability, then the most probable number of people from that group who have the DNA profile at issue is around 4 or 5.  

The Court of Appeal's advice is a step in the right direction, but a more revealing way of looking at the matter is this.   If, as a juror, the only information you have about the guilty person prior to the DNA evidence is that he must be a sexually active white male, then presumably - and again I stress that this is on the assumption that you have no further information - you ought to think of the accused before you as having been randomly selected from the whole population of white sexually active males in the country at the time.  Hence if there are 22 million such people, then your prior probability on his being guilty ought to be 1 in 22 million.  This will imply that, once you bring in the fact that he matches the DNA profile that has matching probability of 1 in 5 million, your eventual probability (the posterior probability as we say) that he is guilty should be 1 in 4.4: presumably nowhere near high enough to place his guilt 'beyond reasonable doubt'.

Does this make the fact that several people have been convicted in British courts on the basis purely of DNA probabilities of this order, and of no other evidence, hard to defend rationally? Well certainly 'yes' if this is the correct attitude towards the prior. Now in fact a juror - and I speak from personal experience here - is pushed towards the view that this ought to be his or her prior: he or she is supposed to discount entirely any suspicion that this particular person before the court would not be there if there weren't at least a reasonable chance that he is guilty - that the police would not have arrested him had there not been some initial evidence, not all of it presentable in court, and so on.  A juror is indeed supposed to think that prior to any evidence they hear in court, the person before them might just have well have had his or her name drawn at random from a hat in which there all the names of all the people currently in the country.  Now, once articulated, this is of course clearly a preposterous assumption and not one that a juror is really likely to make no matter what he or she is told about correct legal procedure.  And hence the juror, quite rightly I would say, is very unlikely to have the corresponding prior.

This consideration might make one feel a little less disconcerted by the convictions that I mentioned: except that in some of the cases the police procedure involved in the arrest and bringing to trial of the convicted person, exactly involved comparing DNA found at the crime scene with a data base of DNA profiles and arresting the person from the data base who matched the profile. In all these cases, the DNA match was the sole evidence linking the accused to the crime.  As we are seeing, whether or not the courts' decisions in these cases were reasonable, depends - once we apply proper probabilistic reasoning - on two things not one: not only the match probability but also the prior.  What's the appropriate prior probability when someone has been accused simply on the basis of matching crime scene DNA to a DNA profile kept on a data base of such profiles?  Well if it were simply an haphazard or "random" matter whether or not your DNA profile was on a data base available to the police, then it would seem that the only reasonable thing to assume is that the profiles on the data base are a random sample of such profiles from the whole British population and so reasonable to think of the accused as simply a random choice from that whole population. If so, then the prior probability should be 1 in 60 million that this person is guilty. Even with a DNA match probability of 1 in 5 million, this means that, given that the DNA evidence is the only evidence, there is only a 1 in 12 chance that the accused is guilty and hence an 11 in 12 chance that he is innocent - and this is scarcely to put the matter of the defendant's guilt 'beyond reasonable doubt'!

Now in the real world of course, the set of DNA profiles on the national DNA data base cannot be regarded as a random sample from the whole population - instead your DNA profile will be on that data base as things stand only if you already have a criminal record or are otherwise known to the police.  And this, although not permissible evidence in court, just does mean, with all due deference to the civil liberties lobby, that the prior probability that the person is guilty is higher than it would be if he or she were just a random selection from the whole population. So maybe these convictions were not as outrageous as they otherwise might seem - it's difficult to tell, precisely because it's difficult to know what the truly appropriate prior is.  Notice, however, that as we move towards, as we are moving towards in Britain, a national DNA data base involving people without, as well as with, criminal records then we move towards the situation where the correct prior probability of the guilt of a person identified simply on the basis of a DNA match from this data base is one in the whole population – 1 in around 60 million in British terms.





Case Three: ECMO, morality and methodology

For my third and final example, I turn back to medicine.  

It is has come to be widely believed within the medical profession that the only truly scientific, the only really ‘valid’ evidence for the effectiveness of any proposed new therapy is that supplied by the results of properly conducted randomised clinical trials.  Any other attempt to justify a claim about the efficacy or otherwise of the treatment -whether based on analysis of existing data, or even on the results of experiments if they have not been randomised - is inevitably subject to bias.

The fear about non-randomised experiments is exactly an elaboration of the post hoc ergo propter hoc worry that I already mentioned. Suppose you tried to estimate the success of some new treatment simply by giving it to some group of patients and compared the results in that group with the results contained in historical records of patients with the same condition but treated in the older way.  Suppose that the success rate in the newly treated group was higher.  Still it is, of course, entirely possible that those in the treatment group were importantly different in all sorts of ways from the 'historical controls', and it may be these other differences rather than the fact that they were given the new therapy that accounts for their relative improvement.  Very sick patients will not be entered in trials, those that are entered will standardly receive very diligent treatment, often from medics who are in the forefront of their field, it may simply be that the population as a whole has developed better immunity to the disease involved over time, or have a better general level of health and so on.

In a randomised experiment, on the other hand, two groups - the treatment group and the control group - are studied concurrently: everyone in the trial is assigned to one of the groups, which one being decided by some random mechanism, say the toss of a fair coin.  Those in the experimental group are given the new treatment, while those in the control group are given the currently standard treatment, or in some trials a placebo.  These trials are also generally performed 'double blind' - that is, neither the patient himself nor the attending physician knows whether he or she is receiving the experimental or the control treatment.

The claim is that such randomised controlled trials eliminate, or to all intents and purposes eliminate, the possibility of bias.  In randomised trials we can safely infer that any improvement in those given the therapy was due to the therapy and not to some extraneous factor or factors. And only in randomised trials are we safe in making that inference.  Is this claim justified?  This is clearly again a philosophy of science issue - one about which kinds of result carry real evidential weight and why.  Moreover it is an issue that it is vital to settle not for any abstract epistemological reasons but for practical and ethical reasons of the highest order. Here's a case that shows why.


A mortality rate of more than 80% had been observed historically in neonates experiencing a condition called persistent pulmonary hypertension of the new born (PPHS).   A new method of treatment   -  "extracorporeal membranous oxygenation" (ECMO) -  was introduced in the late 1970s and Bartlett and colleagues at Michigan found, over a period of several years, mortality rates of less than 20% in infants treated by ECMO. So they had turned a historical mortality rate of 80% into a survival rate amongst the patients they had already treated at least of 80%.  These researchers felt forced to perform an RCT   (".. we were compelled to conduct a prospective randomised study") despite the fact  that this experience had already given them a high degree of confidence in ECMO ("We anticipated that most ECMO patients would survive and most control patients would die ..")  They felt compelled to perform a trial because their claim that ECMO was significantly efficacious in treating PPHS would, they judged, carry little weight amongst their medical colleagues unless supported by a positive outcome in such a trial.  These researchers clearly believed that, in effect, the long established mortality rate of more than 80% on conventional treatment provided good enough controls - that babies treated earlier at their own and other centres with conventional medical treatment provided sufficiently rigorous controls; and hence that the results of more than 80% survival that they had achieved with ECMO showed that ECMO was a genuinely efficacious treatment for this dire condition.  But, because historically controlled trials are generally considered to carry little or no weight compared to RCTs, these researchers went ahead and conducted the trial.

They reported its outcome in 1985.   Babies suffering from PPHS were allocated to ECMO treatment or to the "control group" (which received the then conventional medical therapy - CT) using a modified protocol called "randomised play the winner".  This protocol involves assigning the first baby to treatment group purely at random - say by selecting a ball from an urn which contains one red (ECMO) and one white (CT) ball; if the randomly selected treatment is a success (here: if the baby survives) then an extra ball corresponding to that treatment is put in the urn, if it fails then an extra ball corresponding to the alternative treatment is added.  The fact that this protocol, rather than pure randomisation, was used was clearly itself a compromise between what the researchers saw as the needs of a scientifically convincing trial and their own convictions about the benefits of ECMO.  

As it turned out, the first baby in the trial was randomly assigned ECMO and survived, the second was assigned CT and died.  This of course produced a biassed urn, which became increasingly biassed as the next 8 babies all happened to be assigned ECMO and all turned out to survive.  The protocol, decided in advance, declared ECMO the winner at this point, though a further two babies were treated with ECMO (officially "outside the trial") and survived.  So the 1985 study reported a total of 12 patients, 11 assigned to ECMO all of whom lived and 1 assigned to CT who died.  (Recall that this is against the background of a historical mortality rate for the disease of around 80%.)

Ethics and methodology are fully intertwined here.  How the ethics of undertaking the trial in the first place are viewed will depend, amongst perhaps other things, on what is taken to produce scientifically significant evidence of treatment efficacy.   If it is assumed that the evidence from historical (and contemporary) study was already good enough to give a high degree of confidence that ECMO was better than CT, then the ethical conclusion might seem to follow that the death of the infant assigned CT in the Bartlett study was unjustified.  

But if, on the other hand, it is taken that

.. the only source of reliable evidence about the usefulness of almost any sort of therapy .. is that obtained from well-planned and carefully conducted randomized .. clinical trials (Tukey1977; emphasis supplied)

then you're likely to have a different ethical view, even perhaps that 

the results [of the 1985 study] are not ... convincing... Because only one patient received the standard therapy, .. (Ware and Epstein, 1985)

Many commentators in fact took this latter view and concluded that

Further randomized clinical trials using concurrent controls and .. randomization .. will be difficult but remain necessary. (ibid.)

Those taking this second view held that neither the “historically controlled” results (i.e. the comparison of the mortality rates achieved with ECMO with the historical mortality rate achieved with conventional treatment) nor the results from this initial “randomised play the winner” trial had produced any reliable, scientifically-telling information.  The Michigan trial had not produced any real evidence because - in deference to the researchers’ prior convictions - it had not been “properly randomised”.   Indeed, they even imply that such trials and their “historically controlled” antecedents, have, by encouraging the belief that the new treatment was effective in the absence of proper scientific validation, made it more difficult to perform a “proper” RCT: both patients and more especially doctors find it harder subjectively to take the objectively dictated line of complete agnosticism ahead of proper evidence.  Some such commentators have therefore argued that historical and non-fully randomised trials should be actively discouraged.  (Of course since historical trials simply happen when some new treatment is tried instead of some conventional treatment, this really amounts to the suggestion that no publicity should be given to a new treatment and no claims made about its efficacy ahead of an RCT.)

In the ECMO case, this line led to the recommendation of a further, and this time “properly randomised”, trial which was duly performed.  This second trial involved a fixed experimental scheme with conventional randomisation but with a stopping-rule that specified that the trial was to end once 4 deaths had occurred in either experimental or control group.  A total of 19 patients were, so it turned out, involved in this second study: 9 of whom were assigned to ECMO (all of whom survived) and 10 to CT (of whom 6 survived, that is 4 died).  Since the stopping-rule now specified an end to the trial but various centres were still geared up to take trial-patients, a further 20 babies who arrived at the trial centres suffering from PPHS were then all assigned to ECMO (again officially "outside the trial proper") and of these 20 extra patients 19 survived.

Once again, views about the ethics of this further trial and in particular about the 4 deaths in the CT group will depend on what epistemological view is taken about when it is or is not reasonable to see evidence as validating some claim.  If it is held that the first trial was indeed methodologically flawed (because “improper” randomisation had resulted in only one patient being in the control group) and therefore that no real objective information could be gathered from it, then the conviction that the first trial result (let alone the historically controlled evidence) had already shown that ECMO was superior was merely a matter of subjective opinion.   Hence this second trial was necessary to obtain proper scientific information.  On the other hand, if the correct methodological judgment is that the evidence both from previous practice and from the initial trial was already rationally compelling, then this second trial, and the deaths of 4 infants treated by CT in it, would seem to be clearly unethical. 

Let me mention in passing the UK twist on this particular story.  Several years after ECMO had become standard treatment in the US for infants with PPHS, it was decided - for reasons that baffle me - that the US experience may not extrapolate to the UK and a trial of ECMO in the UK was necessary before its introduction within the NHS.  Although it is regarded by some statisticians as doubtful practice and although the attending physicians are always kept 'blind', there is always nowadays a monitor in these trials who is privy to which patients have been assigned to which group and who is empowered to stop the trial under certain conditions.  It will perhaps not surprise you to know that the UK ECMO trial was stopped early - indeed very early - when it became clear to the monitor at least that ECMO was overwhelmingly superior. Though even this early stopping occurred of course only after, indeed as a result of, many infants dying when assigned to the control arm.






Well, that's what I wanted to say, but let me add a few remarks in closing that bring me back to my beginning.  The Pittsburgh Center has long been the foremost Centre for the discipline internationally.  There is of course a long history of - I trust mutually - beneficial interaction between Pittsburgh philosophers and those in the UK and especially at the LSE. Many people from Pittsburgh Philosophy of Science have, I'm glad to say, been in London and given talks at some stage, but let me especially mention Sandy Mitchell (an LSE alumna), and again Adolf Grunbaum, who has been a frequent visitor and remains a member of our Lakatos Award Management Committee run from LSE, and also John Earman, who aside from being the proud owner of the biggest pecs in philosophy (or so he tells me) has also been a regular visitor to London and is one of the members of the small group of hyper-distinguished winners of the Lakatos Award, the leading book prize in philosophy of science internationally that is, as I mentioned, administered from LSE.  On our side Nancy Cartwright (herself a Pitt graduate of course), Michael Redhead (now rescued from Cambridge and safely ensconced in our LSE Centre) and I have all spent periods as Center Fellows: speaking for myself the year I spent in the Center in 1982-3, with a wonderful set of fellow Fellows, including Jim Woodward, Ron Giere, Morris Eagle, Tom Nickles and Ron Laymon, was an exceptionally formative experience for me, one whose benefits I very much continue to reap.  But it is not just the visits of course, that are important but rather the exchange of ideas, and the mutual - and nowadays, I hope, entirely friendly - criticism.  (I say 'nowadays friendly', because Popper had a well-established, and in my opinion well-deserved, reputation for being prickly and unpleasant and having a reaction to criticism of his own views that was diametrically opposed to the one advocated by his own philosophy - the joke around the LSE used to be that his book was not called The Open Society and its Enemies, but rather The Open Society by one of its Enemies.)  So in wishing the Center a very happy birthday, and especially many happy returns, I say long may the friendly exchange of ideas continue (as I'm sure it will).  As I hope I've convinced all of you - philosophers and non-philosophers alike - the issues that we philosophers of science work on together are not only of great intellectual significance, but also of great practical and social import.  
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